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Abstract 
 
Asymmetry is characteristic of federal systems of government in the world, 
although the nature and extent of the asymmetry differs from one system to 
another. A distinction could be made between political asymmetry and 
constitutional asymmetry, which could be structured in different ways. The 
notion of asymmetry featured in the constitutional negotiation process in the 
nineties in South Africa. During the final stage of negotiations a political 
compromise was reached to have a more inclusive process, which opened the 
door for some form of constitutional asymmetry. The accommodation of cultural 
and regional diversity influenced the particular form and scope of asymmetry 
created by the Constitution. Two examples of how the constitutional asymmetry 
is utilised in practice is the adoption of the Western Cape Constitution, which 
also created own institutions particular to the Western Cape; and the recognition 
of the Zulu Monarch by the KwaZulu–Natal Provincial Government. This is done 
by way of legislation, specific budget allocations and special functions such as 
the opening of the KwaZulu–Natal Provincial Legislature. In a country with much 
diversity, such as South Africa, it is appropriate to accommodate diversity by 
way of some form of constitutional asymmetry. 
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Asymmetry in Federal Systems – Constitutional 
Arrangements in South Africa 
Dirk J. Brand 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Asymmetry is characteristic of federal systems of government in the world, 
although the nature and extent of the asymmetry differs from one system to 
another. Watts distinguishes between “political asymmetry” and 
“constitutional asymmetry”. He describes political asymmetry, which is a 
common feature in all federal systems, as the relative influence of the various 
constituent units within a federation that arises from the impact of cultural, 
economic, social and political conditions.
1 Constitutional asymmetry, 
according to Watts, implies the constitutional assignment of different powers 
to different constituent units, which is not such a common feature in many 
federal systems. 
There are different approaches to constitutional asymmetry. Firstly, a 
constitution could provide for an increase in national or federal powers over 
specific provinces
2 for some specified functions. Such an arrangement reduces 
provincial autonomy. It could be done as a temporary measure if some 
provinces do not have sufficient capacity to perform their constitutional 
functions, for example in India where the national government assisted some 
less developed provinces for a couple of years.
3 Secondly, there could be an 
asymmetric assignment of powers to the various provinces to increase 
provincial or regional autonomy, illustrated by the following examples. In 
Canada the status of the French language as an official language in Quebec is 
guaranteed, and in Malaysia two Bornean states received some specified 
powers on joining the Malaysian Federation, which are ordinarily under 
federal jurisdiction.
4 There is also a third approach found in some 
constitutions, namely a formal symmetrical allocation of powers to all the 
provinces, but allowing asymmetrical execution of powers by the various 
provinces. Such an approach would enable provinces to delegate some powers 
to another government or would allow provinces to develop their full 
 
 
1    Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (McGill–Queen’s University Press, Kingston, 2
nd ed. 
1999), 63. 
2   The term ‘provinces’ is used in this paper in reference to sub–national constituent units that could 
be labelled provinces, states or regions in different countries. 
3   Céline Auclair, “Federalism: Its principles, flexibility and limitations”, paper delivered at the 2
nd 
International Conference on Decentralisation, Manila, Philippines, 25–27 July 2002, at 
http://www.forumfed.org  
4   Watts, Comparing Federal Systems …, 66. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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constitutional autonomy at different speeds. Although there is a de jure 
symmetrical assignment of powers, the constitution accommodates a de facto 
asymmetrical development of provincial powers and functions.  
The constitutional development of Spain since 1978 provides an interesting 
example of constitutional asymmetry in practice, which could perhaps be 
described as a fourth approach. There existed various historical nationalities 
and regions with different economic profiles at the time when the Spanish 
Constitution was adopted in 1978. The existing diversity was acknowledged in 
the constitutional design. Provision was made for de jure asymmetrical 
constitutional development of the Autonomous Communities (provinces), 
which the respective Communities could develop on a bilateral basis with the 
national government.
5 There is also provision in the Spanish Constitution that 
“bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic 
characteristics, island territories and provinces with historic regional status 
may accede to self–government and form Autonomous Communities”.
6 In 
practice the various communities developed their respective constitutional 
autonomy at different speeds with Catalonia and the Basque Country normally 
leading the way and the others following, and by 1982 all of the constituent 
territories have become Autonomous Communities. There is also an 
asymmetric approach regarding specific functional areas, for example Navarre 
and the Basque Country initially enjoyed more fiscal autonomy than the other 
communities.
7 Catalonia later successfully negotiated some fiscal reform 
measures with the national government that provided more financial 
autonomy at the Community level.
8 Financial and fiscal issues, however, 
remain a complex and difficult matter that is currently a hotly debated issue 
within the discussions on constitutional reform in Spain. The recognition of 
the relative fiscal autonomy of the various Autonomous Communities gives rise 
to issues about sharing of revenue or financial equalisation. The existence and 
recognition of asymmetry, whether it relates to the constitutional allocation 
of powers or the differences in economic profile of Autonomous Communities, 
should be an important part of the discussions on fiscal reform or the design 
of any financial equalisation mechanisms.  
In federal states a fiscal disparity between the provinces normally leads to 
some form of financial equalisation. The existence of an asymmetric economic 
 
 
5    Luis Moreno, “Decentralization in Spain”, 36(4) Regional Studies (2002), 399–408, at 400, at 
http://www.regional–studies–assoc.ac.uk; Watts, Comparing Federal Systems …, 68; Robert 
Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in Spain”, 17(4) International Political Science Review (1996), 385–401, 
at 387.  
6   Art. 143 of the Constitution of Spain; Siobhan Harty, “Spain”, in Ann L. Griffiths (ed.), Handbook of 
Federal Countries 2005 (McGill–Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2005), 324–341, at 328. 
7  Moreno “Decentralization ...”, 401; see also Art. 148 of the Constitution of Spain. 
8   Violeta R. Almendral, “Fiscal rights for Communities in the Spanish constitution”, 6(1) Federations 
(February/March 2007), 16–20, at 17. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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and fiscal situation at provincial level is thus accommodated on the one hand, 
while financial equalisation mechanisms are also instituted on the other hand. 
The economic reasoning behind financial equalisation is to provide an 
adequate and equitable provision of public goods and services to all citizens.
9 
In financial intergovernmental relations there is always a balancing act to find 
the appropriate balance between different, and sometimes opposing, notions 
such as competition, solidarity, asymmetry and equality. Competition 
between provinces is quite common, whether it is to be the best or the most 
innovative or the most tax friendly province, and it is often built on the 
unique characteristics that distinguish the one province from the other. 
Solidarity, on the other hand, suggests an acknowledgement of the 
differences that exist between provinces and the need to develop actions or 
mechanisms through which the stronger or richer provinces could support the 
weaker or poorer provinces. Solidarity could be an important motivating 
factor in the development of financial equalisation mechanisms.
10 
2. South African Constitutional Approach to Asymmetry 
2.1 Constitutional Negotiation Process 
The issue of creating unity while also accommodating diversity was a critical 
question during the constitutional negotiations in the early nineties. While 
there was common cause that the new constitutional order in South Africa 
must be an inclusive democracy where all the citizens had equal rights, there 
were conflicting views on the nature of the constitutional system, in 
particular relating to the status and powers of the provinces. The ANC 
(African National Congress) favoured a strong centralised system with 
relatively weak provinces, while the other major political parties, namely the 
Democratic Party, National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party, supported the 
idea of a federal type system where the provinces would have constitutionally 
entrenched legislative and executive powers and functions. Inherent in this 
view was the notion of asymmetry, namely that provinces should be allowed 
some scope for reflecting their own specific needs and characteristics. This 
matter remained a major issue throughout the constitutional negotiations 
during the Multi–Party Negotiation Process, in the Constitutional Assembly as 
well as during the certification process before the Constitutional Court.  
The two main opposing views about the constitution making process were 
that of the African National Congress (ANC) on the one hand, which was quite 
determined that an elected body should draft the new constitution and be 
bound as little as possible by the outcome of the negotiation process 
 
 
9   Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance in a Democratic Society. Vol. 3 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, 2000), 413. 
10   Dirk J. Brand, Financial Constitutional Law (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg, 2006), 19–23. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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conducted by non–elected representatives of various organisations and 
parties. The National Party (NP) Government, with support from other parties, 
on the other hand held the view that the negotiating parties at Kempton Park 
should negotiate the constitutional text as far as possible and the 
constitutional assembly should then be bound by such decisions.
11 Neither of 
these two approaches was acceptable to all the parties and a new way had to 
be negotiated out of this deadlock. The negotiating parties have thus agreed 
to the following two–phase process, namely that a first or interim constitution 
should be drafted by the negotiating parties at the Multi–Party Negotiating 
Process (MPNP). The next phase would be an election for a new parliament 
that would also act as the constitution drafting body for the new or final 
constitution. A crucial element of this agreement on process was the adoption 
of a set of Constitutional Principles.
12 
The final part of the constitutional development process consisted of two 
stages, namely the negotiation of a new constitution by an elected 
Constitutional Assembly, and certification of the new constitutional text by 
the newly established Constitutional Court. The new text had to be measured 
against a set of 34 Constitutional Principles (CP’s)
13 agreed to at the Multi–
Party Negotiation Process in Kempton Park near Johannesburg. At a critical 
point in the negotiation process where the opposing views about the future 
processes were clearly emphasized, this agreement on process and principles 
was really ground–breaking and it paved the way for all the negotiating parties 
to go forward on the constitution making path.  
2.2 Constitutional Principles 
This compromise was referred to as a ‘solemn pact’, which clearly indicated 
the importance and nature of this agreement.
14 These principles formed the 
framework for the development of the new constitution, and it therefore 
contained principles that referred to the most important elements for the 
establishment of a constitutional democracy, for example the structure of 
government, a justiciable bill of rights, and separation of powers.
15 
The following CP’s relate to the structural or organisational elements of 
government, namely: 
 
 
 
12   Bertus de Villiers, “The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance”, in id. (ed.), Birth of a 
Constitution (Juta, Cape Town, 1994), 37–49, at 40–41. 
13   The Constitutional Principles are contained in Schedule 4 to the 1993 Constitution. 
14   Preamble to the 1993 Constitution; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996, 199610 BCLR 1253 CC, 1996 (4) SA 744 CC, para. 15. 
15   De Villiers, “The Constitutional Principles …”, 42; Iain Currie and Johan de Waal, The New 
Constitutional and Administrative Law. Vol. 1 Constitutional Law (Juta, Cape Town, 2001), 60–71. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
 
•  CP VI – separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary; 
•  CP XVI – structuring of government at three levels; 
•  CP XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII – powers and functions of national and 
provincial governments; 
•  CP XXIV – local government powers, functions and structures 
•  CP XXV, XXVI – fiscal powers 
As far as the structural arrangements are concerned, the basic premise as 
reflected in the CP’s was that of symmetry or equal treatment of the 
provinces. The CP’s did not make special provision for specific circumstances 
of any one province. It did, however, create space for any province to adopt a 
provincial constitution, which is an important source of constitutional 
asymmetry. 
The following CP’s make provision for asymmetry: 
•  CP XVIII.2 – Reference is made in this constitutional principle to the 
competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its 
province. This was potentially a significant source of constitutional 
asymmetry. Some of the political parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party 
favoured a more autonomous provincial dispensation, which included the 
possibility that those provinces who wanted it could develop their own 
provincial constitutions. In this way provincial autonomy could be 
strengthened. 
•  CP XIII – The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, including 
a traditional monarch are acknowledged by this CP. Not all the provinces 
had traditional leaders, in particular not a traditional monarch. This CP also 
stipulated that a provincial constitution could provide for the institution, 
role, authority and status of a traditional monarch and that the national 
constitution should protect it. 
Although various parties supported the notion of asymmetry, the 
recognition thereof was of particular importance for the Inkatha Freedom 
Party and the Conservative Party who both wanted more autonomy for their 
particular constituencies. CP XXXIV was specifically included during the final 
stages of the negotiating process to allow for “the right to self–determination 
by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, whether 
in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognised way.” The 
inclusion of this CP made the constitutional negotiation process more inclusive 
and contributed to the elimination of serious conflict. 
The CP’s formed a crucial mechanism in the constitution making process 
and provided a bridge between the 1993–Constitution and the 1996–
Constitution. The Constitutional Court, in its certification of the new text of 
www.eurac.edu/edap 9  edap@eurac.edu Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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the constitution, confirmed the foundational nature of the Constitutional 
Principles to the new constitution.
16 
2.3 Current Constitution 
In assessing the accommodation of asymmetry in the current South African 
Constitution various provisions, discussed in the following paragraphs, are 
relevant.  
In contrast to Canada where specific provision is made for the recognition 
and protection of the French language in Quebec (asymmetric accommodation 
of languages in Canadian provinces), the issue of language is dealt with on a 
symmetric or equal basis in the South African Constitution. Section 6 (1) of 
the Constitution
17 provides for 11 official languages in South Africa and in 
section 6 (4) it is determined that “all official languages must enjoy parity of 
esteem and must be treated equitably.” Most of these languages have a 
regional geographic basis and are not commonly used everywhere in the 
country. There is therefore some flexibility in the Constitution which provides 
that provinces may use at least two official languages for the purposes of 
government, thus recognising the regional importance of languages.
18 Despite 
these provisions regarding equality of languages, the de facto official 
language in South Africa is English and not much is done by the Government to 
give effect to the equal and equitable treatment of the official languages. At 
a provincial level various provinces have adopted policies or practical 
measures to recognise the official languages spoken in that province, for 
example Afrikaans, English and isiXhosa are the official languages used in the 
Western Cape, and in KwaZulu–Natal English, isiZulu, isiXhosa and Afrikaans 
are used for official purposes. The Western Cape has taken it a step further 
and has adopted specific legislation, namely the Western Cape Provincial 
Languages Act, 13 of 1998, to give effect to the provisions regarding the use 
of official languages in the Constitution.
19 
Further provisions regarding the use of languages are found in the Bill of 
Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, namely: 
Sec 29(2): “Everyone has the right to receive education in the official 
language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions 
where that education is reasonably practical.” 
 
 
16   Certification judgment, para. 15. 
17   These languages are: Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, 
isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu. 
18   Sec. 6(3) of the Constitution; Rassie Malherbe and Dirk J. Brand, “South Africa – Subnational 
Constitutional Law” in André Alen et al. (eds.), International Encyclopaedia of Laws (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2001), 148. 
19   Dirk J. Brand, “Constitutional language rights in Canada and South Africa” Tydsrif fir suid–
afrikaanse Reg (1997) No. 4, 689–699. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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Sec 30: “Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in 
the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may 
do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
The constitutional approach to languages is thus one of equality and equity, 
while allowing for regional differences, thus supporting an asymmetric 
development. Language diversity is thus protected and promoted by the 
Constitution, but unfortunately the practice signifies the dominance of English 
to the detriment of the other official languages. In education it also means 
that language communities have to battle for the practical implementation of 
this right.
20 On the structural elements of government the constitutional 
negotiation process resulted in a decentralised system of government, 
consisting of the national government, nine provincial governments and local 
government, with a constitutional distribution of functions between the three 
spheres of government.
21 
South Africa is a large country and its nine provinces are quite diverse – in 
terms of history, geography, economic profile and demographic factors. These 
provinces were newly created by the 1993–Constitution
22 and their 
establishment was based on an independent report presented to the Multi–
Party Negotiating Process.
23 The size and characteristics of the nine provinces 
differ a lot and the provincial level of government thus have an asymmetric 
profile, which is in itself not unique and in fact quite common to federal 
systems of government. The system of provincial government and the 
establishment of the nine provinces were re–confirmed in the ‘final’ 
Constitution in 1996.
24 
The possibility of adopting a provincial constitution was a contentious and 
much debated issue during the constitutional negotiation process. There was 
strong support from some minority parties and from two provinces, namely 
Western Cape and KwaZulu–Natal, for the development of own provincial 
constitutions as an expression of provincial autonomy. As part of the political 
compromise specific provisions were included in the Constitution that allow 
for the development of an own provincial constitution within the framework 
of the national Constitution.
25 Specific provision is made that a province may 
decide to create legislative or executive structures and procedures that differ 
 
 
20   Rassie Malherbe, “’n Universiteit se taalbeleid as ‘n uitdrukking van grondwetlik–beskermde 
diversiteit”, Tydsrif fir suid–afrikaanse Reg (2005) No. 4, 708. 
21   Brand,  Financial Constitutional Law …, 54; Malherbe and Brand, South Africa – Subnational 
Constitutional Law …, 21. 
22   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 200 of 1993. 
23   Brand, Financial Constitutional Law …, 107.  
24   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Malherbe and Brand, South Africa – Subnational 
Constitutional Law …, 19. 
25   Sec. 142–145 of the Constitution. Similar provisions were included in the 1993 Constitution. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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from those in the Constitution, and to provide for the institution, role, 
authority and status of a traditional monarch. A provincial constitution must 
first be certified by the Constitutional Court before it can become law.
26 
These provisions are in line with CP XVIII.2 and are an important element of 
constitutional asymmetry in South Africa. 
The Constitution makes provision for concurrent and exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction.
27 Most of the functional areas of provincial government fall 
within the concurrent field. Due to the development of concurrency, the 
provinces do not have complete authority over a particular functional area, 
and as a result the scope of legislative authority of provinces may differ.
28 
This could lead to an asymmetrical relationship between the national and 
provincial spheres of government – some provinces may occupy the legislative 
terrain more actively than others and thus develop more autonomy. In 
practice, however, Parliament has legislated extensively in the concurrent 
field since 1994 while provinces have not optimally utilised that constitutional 
space. 
 encroaching on 
provincial autonomy or ‘functional integrity’ of provinces.
30  
 
The Constitution provides that national legislation within the concurrent 
field will prevail over provincial legislation on the same subject if it applies 
uniformly in the country and it establishes “uniform norms and standards” 
throughout the country (so–called overriding provisions).
29 This approach has 
so far been used often by the national Parliament in various concurrent fields 
to the detriment of provincial autonomy and the accommodation of 
asymmetry. Such an approach to a concurrent field, for example education, 
negates diversity and the potential benefits of asymmetry. Despite the fact 
that it might sometimes be necessary t o  l a y  d o w n  u n i f o r m  s t a n d a r d s  i n  
specific fields for the whole country, it is constitutionally problematic if the 
national Parliament uses the guise of uniform standards to simply cover the 
field on a specific concurrent functional area and thus
At the executive level there is also scope for asymmetric development. The 
Constitution makes specific provision for the delegation of executive powers 
from one executive organ of state in any sphere of government to another and 
for the provision of agency services on behalf of another executive organ of 
 
26   Sec. 144 of the Constitution. 
Sec. 44 (national legislative authority), Sec. 104 (legislative authority of provinces), Schedule 4 
(Functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislati
27   
ve competence) and Schedule 5 
28   tenbach and Rassie Malherbe, Constitutional Law (Butterworths, Johannesburg, 4
th ed. 2004), 
g) of the Constitution. 
(Functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence). 
Ig Rau
250. 
29   Sec. 146(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
30   Sec. 41(1)(Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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state.
31 It is thus possible that for example the Department of Home Affairs 
could delegate some of its functions, which are delivered on a regional basis, 
to a specific province or provinces to perform those functions on behalf of the 
Department. Also legislative powers may be delegated by Parliament to a 
provincial legislature and by a provincial legislature to a municipal council.
32 
These provisions have not been utilised to any significant extent, but creates 
space for asymmetric developments and some flexibility in the exercise of 
authority. 
ions where there was a breakdown in 
effective delivery of services in some municipalities.
34  
e for asymmetric development of functions at the 
local government level. 
There is also provision in the Constitution for asymmetry in a negative 
sense, namely the establishment of intervention mechanisms to deal with 
problems regarding the non–execution of obligations in terms of the 
Constitution or legislation. Provision is made for legislative (section 44) and 
executive intervention (section 100) into provincial government affairs and 
provincial executive intervention in municipal government affairs (section 
139). These provisions are somewhat controversial since they allow one 
sphere of government to intervene in the exercise of functions of another 
sphere of government and thus impeding their constitutional integrity. These 
powers are however defined in the Constitution and aimed at exceptional 
circumstances.
33 There were already a few occasions of provincial 
intervention in specific crisis situat
The Constitution further provides for the assignment of the administration 
of a matter listed in Schedules 4 (functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence) and 5 (functional areas of exclusive 
provincial legislative competence) of the Constitution to a municipality, thus 
also creating space for an asymmetrical development of administrative 
authority at the local government level.
35 The assignment can only take place 
if the particular municipality has the capacity to administer it and the matter 
would be most effectively administered locally. Again, within this legislative 
framework there is scop
Another area where asymmetry sometimes occurs in federal systems is in 
the provincial representation in the second chamber of the national 
legislature. The drafters of the Constitution deliberately decided on an equal 
 
 
31   Sec. 238. 
32   Sec. 44(1)(a)(iii) and 104(1)(c) of the Constitution. Malherbe, “Centralisation of power in 
education …”, 245. 
33   Certification judgment, paras. 254–257, 262–266. 
34   Brand, Financial Constitutional Law .., 111; Christina Murray, “Municipal integrity and effective 
government: the Butterworth intervention” 14 SA Publiekreg/Public Law (1999), 332–380. 
35    Sec. 156(4) of the Constitution; Malherbe and Brand, South Africa  Sub–national Constitutional 
Law …, 126. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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representation of the nine provinces in the second chamber of Parliament, 
namely the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and thus chose against 
asymmetry. Each province is represented in the NCOP by ten delegates (six 
permanent and four special delegates).
36 T h i s  s t a n d s  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  
German situation where the Länder have an unequal or asymmetrical 
representation in the Bundesrat, loosely based on their respective population 
siz
velopment of provinces as 
individual provinces might increase their autonomy. Such national assistance 
do
slation. Assigned legislation 
becomes provincial legislation and a provincial legislature thus has the 
authority to a
 
e.
37 
The fact that the provinces when they were established did not have the 
same economic and developmental profiles is acknowledged in the 
Constitution, where section 125(3) specifically provides that the national 
government must assist provinces in developing the required administrative 
capacity so that a province could fulfil its constitutional mandate.
38 This 
provision creates the possibility of an asymmetric de
es in practice unfortunately not happen much.
39  
As part of the transitional arrangements, section 235(8) of the 1993–
Constitution made provision for the assignment of national legislation, which 
fell within the sphere of provincial legislative competence, to a province, 
provided that the province has the necessary administrative capacity. A 
similar provision is contained in the current Constitution.
40 These provisions 
were necessary to fill the vacuum that existed when the new provinces were 
created and their executives had to govern the respective provinces even 
before any provincial legislation had been developed. In practice, not all 
national legislation within the concurrent field was assigned to provinces and 
Parliament rather developed new legislation within concurrent functional 
areas, thus replacing the old laws.
41 These provisions clearly allow for an 
asymmetric development of provincial legi
mend such assigned legislation.
42  
 
36   Sec. 60 of the Constitution. 
37   Art. 51 of the Basic Law. 
38   Sec. 125(3): “A province has executive authority in terms of subsection (2)(b) only to the extent 
that the province has the administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. The national 
government, by legislative and other measures, must assist provinces to develop the administrative 
capacity required for the effective exercise of their powers and performance of their functions 
referred to in subsection (2).” Certification judgment, para. 267. 
39   Malherbe, “Centralisation of power in education …”, 244. 
40   Schedule 6 Item 14(1). See also discussion on assignment of legislation in Dirk Brand, “Development 
of Concurrent Legislation – a New South African Perspective”, Seminar Report on Subnational 
Constitutional Governance Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg, 1999), 37–44, at 39. 
41   Some examples of assigned legislation are: the Social Assistance Act, No. 59 of 1992, and a series of 
old education laws such as the Education Affairs Act, No. 70 of 1988, which were assigned to 
provinces as part of the transitional measures. 
42   Ex parte Western Cape Provincial Government: In Re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v. North West 
Provincial Government 2000 4 BCLR 347 CC. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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3. Asymmetry in Practice – Some Examples 
The Western Cape is the only province in South Africa that successfully 
adopted a provincial constitution, which was done within the framework of 
the national Constitution.
43 Only one other province, KwaZulu–Natal, 
embarked on a constitution drafting exercise, but was unsuccessful since the 
co
 typical of the Western Cape and to 
str
 
nstitutional text was not certified by the Constitutional Court.
44 
An important motivating factor in the development of the Constitution of 
the Western Cape, 1997, was the support of most of the political parties for 
the constitutional recognition of matters
engthen provincial autonomy.  
The key features of the Western Cape Constitution (WCC) which are 
different from the basic provisions in the South African Constitution are: 
•  The size of the Provincial Legislature is fixed at 42 members, whereas 
national legislation determines the number of members of all the other 
provincial legislatures, and it is based on a formula.
45 
•  The composition of the Provincial Cabinet included the possibility to have 
two members who are not members of the Provincial Parliament, with the 
view to bring expertise from outside the Provincial Parliament into the 
Provincial Cabinet. This provision only applied until the second election of 
the Provincial Parliament under the Western Cape Constitution, which has 
already occurred. So, the Provincial Cabinet now consists of between five 
and ten members who must all be members of the Provincial Parliament.
46 
•  It is determined that there are three official languages for the Western 
Cape, namely Afrikaans, English and isiXhosa, and that additional provincial 
legislation had to be developed to monitor the use of official languages and 
to develop indigenous languages.
47 
•  Provision is also made for the establishment of specific constitutional 
institutions, namely cultural councils, a Commissioner for the Environment 
and a Commissioner for Children.
48  
 
43   Dirk J. Brand, The Western Cape Provincial Constitution: Comments, Text and Judgements, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung Occasional Papers (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg, July 1999); Dirk J. 
Brand, “The Western Cape Provincial Constitution”, 31(4) Rutgers Law Journal (2000), 961–970; Ex 
parte Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Legislature: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Western Cape, 1997, 1997 9 BCLR 1167 CC, 1997 4 795 CC.  
44   Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu–Natal Provincial Legislature: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu–Natal, 1996, 1996 4 SA 1098 CC, 1996 11 BCLR 1419 CC. 
45   Sec. 13 of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997; Sec. 105(2) of the Constitution. 
46   Sec. 42 read with Schedule 3 of the WCC. 
47   Sec. 5 of the WCC. 
48   Sec. 70–80 of the WCC. The Western Cape Cultural Commission and Cultural Councils Act, No. 14 of 
1998, was adopted in accordance with the provisions on cultural councils, and as a consequence of 
this Act the Western Cape Cultural Commission has been established in 1999.  Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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•  The Western Cape Provincial Constitution also provides for the 
development of provincial symbols and the conferral of provincial 
honours.
49 
•  An innovative section on directive principles of provincial policy was also 
included in the Western Cape Constitution.
50 These principles, which are 
The South African Constitution created a narrow scope for provincial 
co
ore autonomy for provinces, which included the adoption of 
provincial constitutions. Better constitutional accommodation of cultural 
div
eadership, namely the Zulu 
Monarch, who is described as the Monarch of the whole Province and is 
re
of the Provincial Legislature, conferring honours, and receiving foreign 
 
mere guiding principles, include issues such as the promotion of a market–
orientated economy, the protection of the natural environment and the 
promotional development of the youth. 
nstitutions, but it nevertheless acknowledged asymmetry in allowing 
provinces to embark on the constitutional development road. 
It is noteworthy that the only two provinces which embarked on the 
provincial constitutional development road are the two provinces where 
political parties other than the ANC played a significant role since 1994. 
Parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, the New National Party (now 
dissolved) and the Democratic Party (now the Democratic Alliance) which 
enjoyed significant support in KwaZulu–Natal and the Western Cape, all 
favoured m
ersity was an important issue in the constitutional debates in these two 
provinces.  
Another example of asymmetrical development is the particular recognition 
of the Zulu Monarch by the KwaZulu–Natal Provincial Government. The 
Constitution has a short chapter, chapter 12, on the recognition and role of 
traditional leaders throughout the country. Various provinces have traditional 
leaders and recognise such leaders by way of legislation and executive 
structures, such as a provincial house of traditional leaders. In KwaZulu–Natal 
there is a further dimension to traditional l
garded as someone with significant cultural and political status in the 
Province as well as in the rest of South Africa.
51 
The KwaZulu–Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, 5 of 2005, 
deals in detail with the recognition of traditional leaders, including the Zulu 
King, the establishment of a house of traditional leaders and their 
responsibilities. Some of the responsibilities of the Zulu King are the opening 
 
Sec. 6 of the WCC. The Western Cape has adopted its own c
49   oat of arms in terms of provincial 
as a system of provincial honours in place. 
51   ithini. See at http://www.zuluroyals.com/
legislation and also h
50   Sec. 81 of the WCC. 
It is currently King Goodwill Zwel  for details about the 
history of the Zulu Royal Dynasty. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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dignitaries.
52 The creation of constitutional space for the asymmetrical 
developments regarding the Zulu Monarch played an important role in 
accommodating cultural diversity in South Africa. If this space was not 
created, it could have led to serious opposition against the further 
constitutional negotiations and even violence in various communities. The 
recognition of provincial autonomy and cultural diversity, in particular in the 
context of KwaZulu–Natal, was one of the key issues promoted by the Inkatha 
Freedom Party during the constitutional negotiations. 
 Inkatha Freedom Party as well as the people from KwaZulu–Natal 
argued for the accommodation of diversity and, in fact, recognition of 
as
tures as 
well as the recognition of traditional leaders within the particular provinces, 
ar
 
4. Conclusion 
South Africa is a country with many contrasts and which is home to a variety 
of cultures, languages and religions. There are also significant economic 
differences within communities as well as between different parts of the 
country. Issues such as equality, unity, diversity and asymmetry remain 
topical issues within the political sphere as well as within various 
communities, and it finds expression in different ways. When people protest 
in the streets for better service delivery within their communities, it is often 
motivated by a need for equitable and equal treatment within the particular 
community. The issues of equality and diversity become very tangible in such 
cases. When people within the Afrikaans community argue that their language 
rights are negatively affected by government policies and legislation, it is a 
question of equality of languages as well as the accommodation of diversity. 
Similarly, the ongoing debates about the need for more mother tongue 
education in public schools throughout South Africa also relates to the 
accommodation of diversity. In arguing for proper recognition of the Zulu 
Monarch, the
ymmetry. 
It is evident that, in particular in a country which such diversity as is the 
case in South Africa, one cannot over–emphasize either equality or diversity in 
order to promote your own political agenda. It would simply create more 
problems than solutions and could even be disastrous. A better approach 
would clearly be to be more receptive for the accommodation of diversity and 
recognition of asymmetry, whether it is in the development of policies or 
legislation. It is thus important to have some degree of flexibility within the 
constitutional system. The constitutional scope for provinces in South Africa 
to create their own constitutions that could have distinguishing fea
e examples of how a constitution could accommodate asymmetry.  
 
52   Sec. 18 of the KwaZulu–Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, No. 5 of 2005. Brand – Asymmetry in Federal Systems
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In promoting unity, it is im ommodate diversity and the 
principle of asymmetry. This approach  ould have been used more extensively 
and creatively in South Africa to the benefit of the country. 
portant to acc
c
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